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As the United States Navy reportedly prepares to mount a direct challenge to 
China’s island-building project in the South China Sea, it is appropriate to focus 
renewed attention on this long-standing irritant in the relationship among China, 
its neighbors in the region, and the United States. In “America’s Security Role in 
the South China Sea,” Andrew S. Erickson, of the Naval War College’s China Mar-
itime Studies Institute, in a presentation originally offered as testimony before the 
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in 
July of 2015, provides a succinct overview and analysis of the issue. He contends 
that “China’s combination of resolve, ambiguity, activities, and deployments has 
corrosive implications for regional stability and international norms. That’s why 
the United States now needs to adjust conceptual thinking and policy to stabilize 
the situation and balance against the prospect of negative Chinese behavior and 
influence.”
It has long been assumed that the most likely trigger of a clash of arms between 
China and the United States is Taiwan. Given China’s increasingly provocative 
behavior in the South China Sea (as well as in the East China Sea with respect to 
Japan), we should revisit this assumption. China’s interest in these areas is not an 
existential one to the same extent as its well-advertised interest in Taiwan. But 
this makes it all the more important to develop a general understanding of the 
dynamics of Chinese crisis behavior across a variety of scenarios. In “The Evolu-
tion of Interstate Security Crisis-Management Theory and Practice in China,” 
Alastair Iain Johnston sets out to do exactly that. In a pathbreaking analysis that 
encompasses a growing Chinese academic literature as well as the organization 
and organizational culture of China’s military and security bureaucracies, John-
ston shows that Chinese crisis-management thinking has been shaped to a sur-
prising extent by the tradition of American, or more broadly Western, theorizing 
on crises originating in the Cold War. While emphasizing that this tradition is in 
many ways in tension with traditional Chinese attitudes toward war, he suggests 
that there may be an opening here for a productive dialogue between the two 
nations. Alastair Iain Johnston is the Governor James Albert Noe and Linda Noe 
Laine Professor of China in World Affairs at Harvard University.
The recently coined military term of art “antiaccess and area-denial” (A2/AD) 
appears in discussions primarily of China’s ability to interpose significant naval 
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and air power between its shores and the American military presence in the Asia-
Pacific region. Jonathan Altman, in “Russian A2/AD in the Eastern Mediterra-
nean: A Growing Risk,” makes the novel and important argument that the new 
Russian presence in Syria and the eastern Mediterranean generally raises very 
similar issues for the United States and its allies in that region. What remains to 
be seen is whether Russia will be able to establish a permanent Syrian base that 
will inevitably change the strategic calculus—particularly for the United States, 
but also notably for Israel—in a dangerously volatile part of the world. Jonathan 
Altman is a program analyst with Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc.
Alfred Thayer Mahan taught that a robust commercial fleet is an inseparable 
component of maritime power. Today it is fashionable to argue or assume that 
the virtual disappearance of an American merchant fleet in recent times gives the 
lie to this idea. But does it? In “The U.S. Merchant Marine: Back to the Future?,” 
Christopher J. McMahon makes the case that the nation’s current reliance on 
foreign-flagged vessels poses an unacceptable danger, both economically and 
strategically. Rear Admiral McMahon, U.S. Maritime Service (Ret.), is currently 
Emory S. Land Chair of Merchant Marine Affairs at the Naval War College. 
It is no secret that military organizations tend to dislike change. In “Systems 
of Denial: Strategic Resistance to Military Innovation,” Andrew Hill and Stephen 
Gerras provide an anatomy of this phenomenon in a larger context that includes 
innovation in business and in theories of science, and offer recommendations 
for overcoming it. At a time when truly paradigm-challenging thinking appears 
to be increasingly at risk, even in the academy (is global warming really “settled 
science”?), it is important to ponder these issues and their implications for pro-
fessional military education. Andrew Hill and Stephen Gerras are professors in 
the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management of the Army War 
College.
If the American way of war is overwhelmingly focused on its kinetic dimen-
sion, the Chinese tend to take a more holistic approach, with special emphasis on 
psychological and legal instruments. But the use of law, both international and 
domestic, as an instrument of irregular or asymmetric warfare is not confined to 
nation-states. As Michael T. Palmer and J. Michael Johnson argue in “Undersea 
Lawfare: Can the U.S. Navy Fall Victim to This Asymmetric Warfare Threat?,” 
activist environmental organizations of varying motivations have proved capable 
of posing obstacles to American naval activities, especially active sonar testing for 
purposes of antisubmarine warfare, that often rise above the level of mere annoy-
ance. They suggest it is time for the Navy to treat this “lawfare” with the serious-
ness it deserves. Captain Michael T. Palmer is a Navy Judge Advocate General 
Corps officer; Rear Admiral J. Michael Johnson (Ret.) is a former naval aviator.
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Finally, we are pleased to note that this column once more has a plurality of 
authors, with the arrival in October 2015 of the new Managing Editor of the 
Naval War College Press, Robert Ayer. Rob is a retired U.S. Coast Guard captain 
and longtime military professor at the Coast Guard Academy, and brings superb 
editorial skills to a demanding assignment. We trust Rob’s Newport experience 
will be a pleasant and productive one.
IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are now located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College 
Coasters Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W334, 
335, 309). For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at 
the main entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (401-
841-2236).
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Allow me to share my assessment of the current situation in the South China Sea, 
followed by my recommendations concerning how the U.S. government should 
understand the situation and how it may best work to address it.
Emerging Situation
A major Chinese narrative regarding the South China Sea is one of unrecipro-
cated restraint. But Chinese leaders have clearly had an ambitious long-term vi-
sion of some sort, backed by years of efforts, themselves based on long-standing 
claims encapsulated in an ambiguous “nine-dash line” enclosing virtually all of 
the South China Sea.
Beijing’s stance regarding South China Sea sovereignty issues is categorical 
and steadfast. In a position paper rejecting outright the Philippines’ recent initia-
tion of international arbitration regarding their bilateral dispute, China’s Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs states, 
China has indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands (the Dongsha 
[Pratas] Islands, Xisha [Paracel] Islands, the Zhongsha Islands [whose main features 
include Macclesfield Bank and Scarborough Shoal] and the Nansha [Spratly] Islands) 
and the adjacent waters.*
Despite all its rhetoric, actions, developmental efforts, and apparent prepara-
tions, however, China has repeatedly declined to disclose the precise basis for, the 
precise nature of, or even the precise geographical parameters of its South China 
Sea claims. As the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence documents, China “has never 
published the coordinates of the “nine-dash line” that it draws around virtually 
the entire South China Sea—perilously close to the coasts of its neighbors, all of 
Testimony by Andrew S. Erickson before a Hearing of the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 23 July 2015.
AMERICA’S SECURITY ROLE IN THE SOUTH 
CHINA SEA
 * “Summary of the Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter 
of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines,” 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 7 December 2014, available at www 
.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1217149.shtml.
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whom it has disputes with. It has not “declared what rights it purports to enjoy 
in this area.”* Beijing still has not specified whether or not it considers the South 
China Sea to constitute a “core interest.” Given China’s statements and actions 
to date, however, there is reason for concern that it is determined to maintain 
expansive claims based on unyielding invocation of the “nine-dash line.” 
Island Seizure History. China’s military and paramilitary forces have a half- 
century-plus history of capturing islands and other features, many in the South 
China Sea. It appears that Beijing long harbored ambitions to seize significant 
numbers of South China Sea islands, and indeed took several occupied by Viet-
nam in 1974 and 1988 even though severely limited in sea and air power at that 
time. Such operations have not received sufficient analytical attention. In some 
respects, they may have been more complex than previously appreciated outside 
China. For example, maritime militia forces appear to have been employed in the 
1974 Paracels conflict, the 2009 Impeccable incident, the 2012 Scarborough Shoal 
standoff, and the 2014 Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig standoff.† It is important to note 
that in none of these cases—nor in recent Chinese cutting of the cables of Viet-
namese oil and gas survey vessels or Chinese intimidation of Philippine forces at 
Second Thomas Shoal—did the United States intervene to stop Chinese actions. 
Regarding the above-mentioned cases that occurred since the end of the Cold 
War, this is, in part, because Washington does not take a position on the relative 
validity of South China Sea countries’ sovereignty claims per se. Instead, what the 
United States opposes consistently is (1) the use of force, or the threat of force, to 
resolve such disputed claims; and (2) attempts to limit freedom of navigation or 
other vital international system-sustaining norms.‡
Industrial-Scale Island Construction. That brings us to recent events, which I be-
lieve have precipitated today’s hearing—and rightly so. In 2014, China greatly ac-
celerated what had long been a very modest process of “island building,” develop-
ing land features in the Spratlys and Paracels on a scale and [with a] sophistication 
 * Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century 
(Washington, D.C., 2015), p. 39, available at www.oni.navy.mil/.
 † For Paracels, ୓ྐྵග [Wan Qiguang], ༡ᾏỈӗබྖᚿ [A Record of South China Sea Fisheries 
Company] (Beijing: ᾏὒฟ∧♫ [Ocean Press], 1991), pp. 115–33. For Scarborough Shoal, 
Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “Tanmen Militia: China’s ‘Maritime Rights Protection’ 
Vanguard,” The National Interest, 6 May 2015, available at nationalinterest.org/. For Haiyang Shiyou 
981, Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “Meet the Chinese Maritime Militia Waging a 
‘People’s War at Sea’,” China Real Time Report (ѝഭᇎᰦᣕ) (blog), Wall Street Journal, 31 March 
2015, blogs.wsj.com/.
 ‡ Daniel R. Russel, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “Remarks at the 
Fifth Annual South China Sea Conference” (The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
Washington, D.C., 21 July 2015), available at www.state.gov/. 
6667_Erickson.indd   8 12/9/15   1:42 PM 6
Naval War College Review, Vol. 69 [2016], No. 1, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss1/1
 E R I C K S O N  9
that its neighbors simply cannot match, even collectively over time.* “Features” 
is the key word here, because many were previously small rocks or reefs not le-
gally considered “islands.” Then China used some of the world’s largest dredgers 
to build up some of the most pristine coral reefs above water with thousands of 
tons of sand, coral cuttings, and concrete. U.S. Pacific Fleet commander Admiral 
Harry Harris aptly terms China’s creation a “Great Wall of Sand.” It has created 
over two thousand acres of “land” where none remained above South China Sea 
waters before.† But it’s what China is constructing atop this artificial edifice that 
most concerns its neighbors and the United States: militarily relevant facilities, 
including at least two runways capable of serving a wide range of military air-
craft, that could allow Beijing to exert increasing influence over the South China 
Sea.
Beijing itself has stated officially that there will be military uses for the new 
“islands” it has raised from the sea. On 9 March 2015, China Foreign Ministry 
spokeswoman Hua Chunying stated that Spratly garrison “maintenance and 
construction work” was intended in part for “better safeguarding territorial sover-
eignty and maritime rights and interests.” ‡ Hua elaborated that construction was 
designed in part to “satisfy the necessary military defense needs.” Chinese military 
sources employ similar wording.
The likely translation, in concrete terms:
• Better facilities for personnel stationed on the features
• Port facilities for logistics, maritime militia, coast guard, and navy ships
• A network of radars to enable monitoring of most of the South China Sea
• Air defense missiles
• Airstrips for civilian and military aircraft
Then-commander of the U.S. Pacific Command Admiral Samuel Locklear’s 15 
April 2015 testimony before the House Armed Services Committee supports this 
assessment: In addition to basing Chinese coast guard ships to expand influence 
over a contested area, “expanded land features down there also could eventu-
ally lead to the deployment of things, such as long-range radars, military and 
advanced missile systems.” Locklear added: “It might be a platform for them, if 
 * For specific details, see “Island Tracker,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Center for Strategic 
and International Studies, amti.csis.org/.
 † Subsequent to this testimony, Chinese reclamation has exceeded 2,900 acres. Department of 
Defense, Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy (Arlington, Va.: 20 August 2015), p. 16, available at 
www.defense.gov/. 
 ‡ As elsewhere in this testimony, italics are inserted by author for emphasis.
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they ever wanted to establish an ADIZ [air defense identification zone] for them 
to be able to enforce that from.”
Airstrips . . . and ADIZ? For airstrips, after structural integrity, it’s length that 
matters most. There’s no need for a three-thousand-meter runway (as China now 
has on Woody Island and Fiery Cross Reef) to support evacuation of personnel 
for medical or weather emergencies via turboprop and other civilian aircraft.* 
Such a runway is only needed to support a full range of military options. Building 
a separate taxiway alongside, as China has already done at Fiery Cross Reef, sug-
gests plans for high-tempo, high-sortie-rate military operations. No other South 
China Sea claimant enjoys even one runway of this caliber on any of the features 
that it occupies.
One logical application for China’s current activities: to support a South China 
Sea ADIZ. Beijing announced an ADIZ in the East China Sea in November 2013. 
Many nations—including the United States—have established such zones to track 
aircraft approaching their territorial airspace (out to twelve nautical miles from 
their coasts), particularly aircraft apparently seeking to enter that airspace.†
Radars on China-controlled features can form a network providing maritime/
air domain awareness for the majority of the South China Sea. Fighter aircraft can 
allow China to intercept foreign aircraft it detects operating there, particularly 
those that do not announce their presence, or otherwise engage in behaviors that 
Beijing deems objectionable.
But while any coastal state is legally entitled to announce an ADIZ, the way 
in which China has done so in the East China Sea is worrisome. China threatens 
still-unspecified “defensive emergency measures” if foreign aircraft don’t comply 
with its orders—orders that an ADIZ does not give it license to issue or enforce 
physically. This suggests that China is reserving the “right” to treat interna-
tional airspace beyond twelve nautical miles as “territorial airspace” in important 
respects.
China’s record on maritime sovereignty fuels this concern. The vast majority 
of nations agree that under international law a country with a coastline controls 
only economic resources in waters twelve to two hundred nautical miles out—
and even less if facing a neighbor’s coast less than four hundred nautical miles 
away. But China additionally claims rights to control military activities in that 
exclusive economic zone, as well as, apparently, in the airspace above it.
 * After this testimony was given, evidence emerged that China was constructing an airstrip on Subi 
Reef as well. Victor Robert Lee, “South China Sea: Satellite Imagery Makes Clear China’s Runway 
Work at Subi Reef,” The Diplomat, 8 September 2015. 
 † For a detailed explanation, see Andrew S. Erickson, “Lengthening Chinese Airstrips May Pave Way 
for South China Sea ADIZ,” The National Interest, 27 April 2015. 
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China currently lacks long-range capable antisubmarine warfare (ASW) as-
sets akin to U.S. P-3 and P-8 aircraft. The more “islands” it builds, even if only 
with helicopter pads (as opposed to full runways), the more it can increase 
helicopter-based ASW coverage of the South China Sea. In this way, distribution 
of Chinese-held features could compensate for ASW helicopters’ “short legs.” 
China could thereby attempt to start to negate one of the last remaining major 
U.S. Navy advantages—submarines—and possibly pursue a bastion strategy for 
its nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) in the South China Sea.
Tipping Point. My Naval War College colleague, China Maritime Studies Institute 
(CMSI) director Peter Dutton, characterizes the aforementioned Chinese activi-
ties as a “tipping point,” meriting U.S. government response. “Militarization of 
the newly constructed islands,” which China appears determined to do, will, he 
argues cogently, alter strategic stability and the regional balance of power. “It will 
turn the South China Sea into a strategic strait under threat of land-based power.”* 
This is part of a “regional maritime strategy . . . to expand China’s interior to 
cover the maritime domain under an umbrella of continental control.”† Dutton 
contends, and I agree, that Beijing’s militarization of artificial islands 
sets the clock back to a time when raw power was the basis for dispute resolution. 
China’s power play, combined with its refusal to arbitrate, its aversion to multilateral 
negotiations, and its refusal to enter into bilateral negotiations on the basis of equal-
ity, undermines regional stability and weakens important global institutions.‡
As bad as things are already, they could get worse—particularly if American 
attention and resolve are in question. In attempting to prevent China from using 
military force to resolve island and maritime claims disputes in the South China 
Sea, the United States will increasingly face Beijing’s three-pronged trident de-
signed precisely to preserve such a possibility. Maritime militia and coast guard 
forces will be forward deployed, possibly enveloping disputed features as part of 
a “Cabbage Strategy” that dares the U.S. military to use force against nonmilitary 
personnel.§ Such forces would be supported by a deterrent backstop that includes 
 * Peter A. Dutton, “Did the Game Just Change in the South China Sea? (And What Should the U.S. 
Do about It?),” A ChinaFile Conversation, 29 May 2015, www.chinafile.com/.
 † Peter A. Dutton, Professor and Director, China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College, 
Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Hearing on China’s Maritime Disputes in the 
East and South China Seas, 14 January 2014, 113th Cong., 2nd sess., available at docs.house.gov/.
 ‡ Dutton, “Did the Game Just Change in the South China Sea?”
 § For a Chinese description of such a concept, see “ᕐਜᘐ: ৽ࡦ㨢ঐዋ ਚ䴰⭘ ‘वᗳ㨌’ ᡈ
⮕” [Zhang Zhaozhong: To Counter the Philippines’ Encroachment on Islands, [We] Need 
Simply to Employ the “Cabbage” Strategy], ⧟⨳㖁 [Global Network], http://mil.huanqiu.com/
observation/2013-05/3971149.html.
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both China’s navy and its “anti-navy” of land-based antiaccess/area-denial 
(A2/AD), or “counterintervention,”* forces, collectively deploying the world’s 
largest arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles. In the region, only Vietnam also has 
a maritime militia, and the U.S. Coast Guard is not positioned to oppose China’s. 
Meanwhile, China’s coast guard is already larger than those of all its neighbors 
combined, and still growing rapidly.†
More broadly, worries about China’s island construction, developing force 
posture in the South China Sea, and accompanying official statements exemplify 
broader foreign concern about China’s rise—that as it becomes increasingly pow-
erful, Beijing will
• Abandon previous restraint in word and deed
• Bully its smaller neighbors
• Implicitly or explicitly threaten the use of force to resolve disputes
• Attempt to change—or else run roughshod over—important international 
norms that preserve peace in Asia and underwrite the global system on 
which mutual prosperity depends
China’s combination of resolve, ambiguity, activities, and deployments has 
corrosive implications for regional stability and international norms. That’s why 
the United States now needs to adjust conceptual thinking and policy to stabilize 
the situation and balance against the prospect of negative Chinese behavior and 
influence. 
The Need for a Paradigm Shift
As Peter Dutton has long emphasized, the way forward for the United States is 
clear: Even as China advances, we cannot retreat. Together with the East China 
Sea and the Yellow Sea, the South China Sea is a vital part of the global commons, 
on which the international system depends to operate effectively and equitably. 
Half of global commerce and 90 percent of regional energy imports transit the 
South China Sea alone. We cannot allow Beijing to carve out within these in-
ternational waters and airspace a zone of exceptionalism in which its neighbors 
face bullying without recourse and vital global rules and norms are subordinated 
to its parochial priorities. This would set back severely what Beijing itself terms 
 * For an explanation of this concept published subsequent to the testimony itself, see Timothy R. 
Heath and Andrew S. Erickson, “Is China Pursuing Counter-intervention?,” Washington Quarterly 
38, no. 3 (Fall 2015).
 † Andrew S. Erickson, “Did the Game Just Change in the South China Sea? (And What Should the 
U.S. Do about It?),” A ChinaFile Conversation, 29 May 2015, www.chinafile.com/.
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